Back to conscience

Now what happens to conscience with moral laws? This was supposed to be a conversation about conscience and all I have been talking about is laws and authorities. Where does conscience fit into this?

Beats me. In fact, it seems like conscience has no part in the discussion, so far anyway.

And I guess that is the first huge mistake it seems to me that Linda Hogan makes. Most of the time conscience isn't necessary. Most of the time we simply make moral judgments or don't even have to think about moral issues to do what is right.

The second big thing is that she seems to think that conscience is primarily about deciding what is or is not wrong as opposed to actually behaving in the correct way.

Suppose B is standing on the bus and notices that a woman standing near him is standing close to a pole and occasionally drifts into it such that her breast touches the pole. So B thinks, "I could casually reach over and hold the pole as if I was steadying myself so that when she next moves closer to it her breast will touch my hand."

Now does B have any doubt whether what he is doing is right? Maybe. It could be that B knows it would be wrong but decides to do it anyway because he doesn't think he will get caught. It is also possible that B thinks it is only wrong if he gets caught.

B1 is the guy most likely to be affected by an appeal from his conscience. His inner voice might say, "What am I doing?"

Conscience will have little purchase in the second case. B2 might be susceptible to worrying about shame if the woman were to loudly say, "Get your hands off me." But he isn't susceptible to any inner voice telling him what he is doing is wrong. He might think, "This sort of thing is inevitable on a crowded bus, so I am not harming anyone by helping the situation along a little."

B2 might change his mind after the fact if the woman is visibly upset at having her privacy invaded (perhaps she is just a teenager or is emotionally vulnerable for some reason at the time). In that case, we can imagine B2 saying to himself, "I thought it wouldn't do any harm." In that case, we might say that B2 operates on a more complex moral principle. Rather than believing it is wrong to invade a woman's privacy, he believes it is only wrong if someone gets hurt. Before the incident, he didn't think it would cause her any emotional distress. Upon seeing that his assumption was incorrect, he is filled with guilt. (It may be that the woman's reaction is such that only he and she know she is upset.)

But what seems clear to me is that conscience can't work without moral laws. It is only because we have come to accept certain moral laws as binding, as having authority over us, that our conscience can work. In both these cases, the feeling of guilt when B1 or B2's conscience speaks to him is possible because he holds a moral law as binding on him. It's not so much that conscience tells him how to interpret the moral law; it's that conscience reminds him that the moral law applies.