MacIntyre has a helpful approach to amiability in that he contrasts it with agreeableness:
... what Aristotle treats as the virtue of agreeableness she treats as only the simulacrum of a genuine virtue—the genuine virtue in question is the one she calls amiability. For the man who practices agreeableness does so from considerations of honor and expediency, according to Aristotle; whereas Jane Austen thought it was possible and necessary for the possessor of that virtue to have a certain real affection for people as such. (It matters here that Jane Austen is a Christian.) After Virtue p 183And you can see the point here if you think of a villain like Willoughby or Wickam. Both are very agreeable men but neither is amiable. Truthfully, neither is constant either but that failure stems from the lack of amiability.
So how does a guy like me have the temerity to criticize a great mind like MacIntyre on this point? I think that the virtues are foundational. You need amiability to have sense and you need amiability and sense before you can have constancy. Everything else, prudence, justice, temperance &c, has to be built on that foundation. Constancy can appear more important because it is rarer and harder to acquire than amiability. But amiability is more important, even though more common, because it is the necessary foundation upon which to build constancy. It's an understandable mistake, particularly as constancy becomes more important in Austen's later works, particularly Mansfield Park and Persuasion.
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